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POSTCONVICTION PROCEDURE
Cheney C. Joseph, Jr.*
HABITUAL OFFENDER PROCEEDINGS
Delay in Sentencing
In State v. McQueen' the Louisiana Supreme Court dealt
with the time within which multiple offender proceedings
must be initiated. Building on its earlier decision in State ex
rel. Williams v. Henderson,2 the court held that a multiple
offender proceeding3 must be instituted without unreasonable delay following the conviction of the accused. In McQueen
the proceeding was instituted three years and eight months
after the defendant's original sentence. The state gave no
excuse for the delay and it knew of the prior conviction at the
4
time of the original sentencing.
The court applied the "without unreasonable delay"
standard of Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 874,
governing sentencing of convicted defendants, to multiple offender sentencing.5 Citing the redactors' comment, 6 it said
that undue delay in sentencing divests the trial court's authority to sentence. Reasoning that a multiple offender proceeding "deals only with the sentencing of a defendant,"7 the
court held that undue delay on the part of the prosecutor in
instituting the multiple offender proceeding divests the prosecutor of his right to seek the enhanced penalty.
In finding article 874 applicable to habitual offender proceedings, the court's result seems both fair and just. As the
court said earlier in Williams, "a case must end at some
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 308 So. 2d 752 (La. 1975).
2. 289 So. 2d 74 (La. 1974). See The Work of the LouisianaAppellate Courts
for the 1973-1974 Term-Criminal Trial Procedure, 35 LA. L. REV. 493, 508
(1975). The court held that the proceedings under LA. R.S. 15:529.1 (Supp.
1956) could not be instituted following completion of the accused's sentence.
3. See LA. R.S. 15:529.1 (Supp. 1956).
4. The prior convictions apparently occurred in the same parish. See
State v. McQueen, 278 So. 2d 114 (La. 1973), discussing the arresting officer's
knowledge of the defendant as a previously convicted person.

5. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 874.

6. Id. comment (c).
7. 308 So. 2d at 755. See also State v. Rowell, 306 So. 2d 668 (La. 1975).
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point."" The same considerations underlying the sixth
amendment right to a speedy trial "compel a conclusion that
upon conviction defendant is entitled to know the full consequences of the verdict within a reasonable time." 9
In State v. Rowell, 10 the court held that the three-day
delay in sentencing provided in Louisiana Code of Criminal
Procedure article 873 was not applicable to sentences imposed
after the conclusion of habitual offender proceedings. The
trial court may sentence the defendant immediately upon
completion of the hearing. That is not to say that the defendant is not entitled to sufficient time to afford him a fair
opportunity to meet the state's allegation that he is a
habitual offender. In State v. Davalie," the court reversed the
trial court in its refusal to give tle defendant adequate opportunity to prepare a defense. 1 2 Speaking of the habitual offender law, 13 Justice Marcus said:
[I]t is only reasonable to assume that the legislature intended that the judge fix the hearing with sufficient delay
to afford the accused an adequate opportunity to investigate the allegations of prior convictions and to respond
thereto. Considerations of fairness and justice require
14
such an interpretation.
The opinion clearly reveals the court's determination that
due process concepts of notice and hearing require such an
5
interpretation.
"Responsive Verdicts"
In State v. Jackson,'6 the Louisiana Supreme Court held
that a defendant charged with being a fourth felony offender
8. 289 So. 2d at 77, quoted with approval in State v. McQueen, 308 So. 2d
752, 754 (La. 1974).
9. Id.
10. 306 So. 2d 668 (La. 1975).
11. 313 So. 2d 587 (La. 1975).
12. The multiple offender bill was filed on Dec. 12, 1973, following conviction on Dec. 5, 1973. Sentencing was set for Dec. 14, 1973. On December 14,
defense counsel informed the trial judge that he did not even have copies of
the multiple offender bill and requested a ten day delay. Over defense objection, the enhancement proceeding was nevertheless held. 313 So. 2d at 589.
13. LA. R.S. 15:529.1 (Supp. 1956).
14. 313 So. 2d at 590.
15. Id.
16. 298 So. 2d 777 (La. 1974).
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may be found a second felony offender and sentenced as such.
In Jackson, the defendant, charged as a habitual offender,
argued that the trial court was limited to finding that he was
or was not a fourth offender and was not authorized to find
that he was a second offender. The court rejected, without
much discussion, the defendant's argument, and interpreted
the statute to allow such "responsive verdicts" in habitual
17
offender proceedings.
The court's analysis of the statute is fair and just. The
import of the habitual offender statute is to enhance statutory penalties in cases of subsequent convictions. At the hearing prescribed by Louisiana R.S. 15:529.1D, the trial court, if
the defendant does not admit the allegations of prior convictions, shall determine whether the offender has been convicted of "a prior felony or felonies."1 8 The court's approach is
also reasonable in view of the constitutional questions that
may arise regarding the use of prior convictions to enhance
punishment.' 9 Not only may the trial judge determine that
the defendant was not the same man previously convicted, he
may decide that one of the prior convictions was constitutionally invalid, and thus may not properly be used to enhance
penalty.
State's Right to Appeal
In State v. Jackson,20 the district attorney appealed the
trial judge's finding that an accused "multiple billed" as a
fourth felony offender was only a second offender. The trial
court rejected two of the prior convictions alleged by the
district attorney. 2' The defendant moved to quash the multiple offender bill on the basis that two of the prior convictions
could not be used to enhance penalty. The trial court "partially quashed" the bill, adjudged the defendant a second
offender, and sentenced him. 22 The court held that the defen17. See LA. R.S. 15:529.1B (Supp. 1956).
18. LA. R.S. 15:529.1D (Supp. 1956), a8 amended by La. Acts 1958, No. 469

§ 1.
19. Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967).
20. 298 So. 2d 777 (La. 1974).
21. The trial court questioned the multiple offender allegations as to a
federal mail theft conviction and as to a California forgery conviction.
22. The defendant was sentenced to ten years in the penitentiary for
attempted forgery. That is twice the maximum penalty provided by LA. R.S.
14:27 (Supp. 1950) and LA. R.S. 14:72 (1950). See LA. R.S. 15:529.1A(1) (Supp.
1956). The trial court gave the defendant the maximum penalty provided by
LA. R.S. 15:529.1A(1) (Supp. 1956).

1976] WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1974-1975

639

dant's "traverse of the allegations of the information are not
such motions to quash (although defendant entitled them
thus) from which the State is entitled to appeal." 23 Although
article 912B permits the state to appeal from a judgment
quashing "an indictment or any count thereof,"24 this does
not, according to Jackson, include rulings "quashing" allegations of prior convictions in multiple offender informations.
While the result in Jackson may be sound, hopefully the
25
court will not refuse to exercise its supervisory juridiction
in a proper case. For example, questions of law may arise
regarding the use of a prior conviction to enhance later
penalties. If the trial court rules that the prior conviction was
legally insufficient for that use, it is submitted that the state
should be entitled to invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of
the Louisiana Supreme Court, just as it may in other situations in which no appeal is provided, 26 to challenge the trial
court's adverse determination on a question of law. Some
language in the opinion intimates the contrary. The court
appears to treat the issue as relating to the sentencing discretion of the trial court.27 To do so, the writer submits, would
be wrong. The purpose of Louisiana R.S. 15:529.1 is to set
maximum and minimum limits on the trial court's exercise of
its sentencing discretion in cases of multiple offenders. If the
2s
question presented is the prior conviction's legal sufficiency,
the court should recognize its authority to review the trial
29
court's ruling.
HARMLESS ERROR
Failure to Object
In State v. McGuffey,3 0 a police officer testified, without
objection, concerning certain inculpatory statements al23. 298 So. 2d at 780.
24. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 912B(1).
25. LA. CONST. art. V, § 5(A); LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 912.

26. See, e.g., State v. Mallet, 284 So. 2d 761 (La. 1973) (the state's right to
seek review by supervisory writs of an adverse trial court ruling suppressing
evidence under LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 703).
27. 298 So. 2d at 780.
28. In fact, Chief Justice Sanders in his dissent suggests that the trial
court was in error in refusing to consider a certain federal conviction for
enhancement purposes. Cf. State v. Jackson, 258 La. 632, 247 So. 2d 558 (1971).
29. Cf. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972); State v. Pierson, 296
So. 2d 324 (La. 1974).
30. 301 So. 2d 582 (La. 1974).
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legedly made by the defendant shortly after his arrest.31
When a second officer was called by the district attorney and
questioned about the same inculpatory statement, defense
counsel objected on the ground that the state failed to give an
article 768 notice.3 2 The objection was overruled.
Affirming the conviction, the court treated the second
officer's testimony as harmless error. The court noted that
had the trial court sustained the objection it would not have
"prevented the testimony from reaching the jury" because
they had already heard "virtually identical evidence" from
the first policeman. 33 Applying the contemporaneous objection rule,3 4 no complaint could be raised regarding the first
officer's testimony. Thus, with the "cat out of the bag" no
harm was done when the evidence was repeated.
Clearly the defendant does not lose his right to object
when identical evidence is again offered. Trial courts should,
however, remain aware of the difference between evidence
that, although inadmissible, is harmlessly admitted, and evidence that, if admitted without objection, cannot form the
basis of an appeal.3 5 Circumstances could arise in which the
defendant fails to object initially, thinking that the objection
might merely call attention to the evidence. When inadmissible evidence is offered again, with subsequent witnesses, he
may properly object. The subsequent testimony does not become admissible due to the initial failure to object. Whether
or not its admission is harmless depends on the circumstances
of the case.
Indictments
Under the jurisprudence prior to State v. James,36 a defendant's best ploy, if he noticed a technical deficiency in an
indictment, was to keep quiet and after conviction raise the
issue by a motion in arrest of judgment or on appeal. This
gave the defendant a chance to obtain acquittal without the
31. The defendant allegedly told the two officers who arrested him that
he started to shoot them.
32. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 768.
33. 301 So. 2d at 584.
34. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 841.
35. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 841, 920.
36. 305 So. 2d 514 (La. 1974).
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risk of a valid guilty verdict. 37 In James the court attempted
8
to remedy that situation by holding that post-verdict attacks on "the sufficiency of the indictment" will not be permitted if there was "no actual lack of notice and no actual
prejudice" to the defendant. 39
Certain errors that are "patent on the face of the record ' 40 do not require contemporaneous objection or written
motion 4 1 to be raised on appeal, since these errors do not
require a review of the evidence. They may be noticed by a
Louisiana appellate court much as a federal appellate court
may notice "plain error" under Rule 52(b) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Defects in indictments are
clearly patent on the face of the record. To the extent that the
court in James talks in terms of precluding defendants from
raising that issue absent prejudice, the court is illogical. That
the existence of prejudice determines whether the error falls
within the scope of appellate review is not, in the writer's
view, sound appellate theory. Many prejudicial errors have
been refused consideration because prior objection and assignment of error were required for review. 42 Whether prejudice exists is not the test for determining the need for prior
objection and assignment of error. Thus, while the court
speaks in terms of not permitting a defendant to raise the
issue of sufficiency of the indictment absent prejudice or prior
objection,4 the writer proposes that the court really meant to
treat such deficiencies as harmless error absent prior objection.
The step taken by the court in James is logical. Although
the harmless error doctrine of Louisiana Code of Criminal
37. Cf. Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973); State v. Birabent, 305
So. 2d 448 (La. 1974).
38. Justice Tate writing for the court said: "The thrust of today's ruling
simply modifies prior jurisprudence that permitted, post-verdict, the questioning of the sufficiency of the indictment even though there was no actual
lack of notice and no actual prejudice." 305 So. 2d at 518.
39. Id. The court further expanded the double jeopardy of the accused in
such cases where the "broad construction" of the indictment is necessary. 305
So. 2d at 519. For a full discussion of defective indictments, see The Work of
the Louisiana Appellate Courts of the 1974-75 Term-PretrialCriminal Procedure, 36 LA. L. REV. 575, 603 (1976).
40. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 920.
41. Id. arts. 841, 851, 859.
42. See, e.g., State v. Shaw, 318 So. 2d 4 (La. 1975) (Barham, J., dissenting);
State v. Donnell, 318 So. 2d 3 (La. 1975).
43. 305 So. 2d at 518.
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Procedure article 921 is not cited as the rationale for James,
the logic of the court falls squarely within the notion of nonreversible error." No doubt the indictment was invalid. 45 Had
the issue been raised prior to verdict in a motion to quash,
failure to amend the indictment to cure the defect would have
been reversible error.46 Possibly the court's reason for avoiding application of the harmless error doctrine stems from its
view of the trial court's duty to apply the code strictly. The
court cannot call the error "harmless" when it is noticed in
advance of trial because to do so would approve, even though
by implication, an obvious refusal on the part of the trial
court to apply the code and jurisprudential standards. Logically, absent prejudice or lack of notice, refusal to amend in
response to a motion to quash would be just as "harmless."
Article 859 allows a defendant to move to arrest judgment
when an essential averment is omitted from an indictment. If
a trial court refuses to arrest judgment in such a case, what
does the court propose? Absent prejudice or lack of notice, the
trial court should broadly construe the indictment in favor of
upholding its validity. The court thereby avoids the conflict
between reversal and the clear mandate of article 859 that
judgment shall be arrested if the indictment lacks an essential averment. The court seems to prefer to say that there
was no error because there was no prejudice rather than
that there was error, but it was harmless.
When the legislative policy cannot otherwise be enforced,
there is nothing wrong with the court's refusal to consider
error harmless. The court should not fear that calling error
harmless may encourage similar violations in future cases. It
should, rather, impress upon the trial court its obligation to
enforce the legislative mandate. It should not hesitate to
reverse convictions if necessary, even though the error has
been called "harmless" before, to enforce legislative policy.
44. The court discusses a theory of "broad construction" of the indictment to uphold its validity. See note 39, supra.
45. See LA. R.S. 14:64 (Supp. 1958); State v. Smith, 275 So. 2d 733 (La.
1973).
46. The court said: "We do not by our present ruling intend to modify the
jurisprudential and statutory pre-trial and at-trial remedies available to a
defendant charged by a defective indictment ....

Thus, if a defective indict-

ment is questioned prior to or during the trial, and if its correction is refused,
we do not mean that such error may not be urged upon appeal in the same
manner as in the past." 305 So. 2d at 518 (emphasis added).
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Notetaking by Jurors
In State v. Ledet 47 the defendant filed a motion for a new
trial, alleging that he had discovered since the verdict" that
one of the jurors took and referred to notes.49 The trial court
heard the testimony of two jurors to the effect that during
deliberation one of the jurors referred to notes taken during
the trial. The "offending juror" testified that he took and
referred to the notes, but that his verdict was based on his
own recollection, not the notes.
In view of the evidence, the juror clearly violated article
793. Neither the state, nor the defense, nor the trial court was
aware of the infraction until after the verdict. Nonetheless,
the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed, based on harmless
error. The court noted that, as expressed in the ABA Standards for the Administration of Criminal Justice, 50 notetaking
by jurors is not prejudicial to the rights of the accused. The
court was also impressed by the fact that this violation of the
statutory mandate was without the knowledge or consent of
the prosecutor or trial court. 51 Further the court was
influenced in its decision to find the error harmless by the
policy considerations behind Louisiana R.S. 15:470, which
prohibits jurors to impeach their verdict. 52 Justice Tate, writing for the court, discussed that policy extensively.
Justice Tate further indirectly expressed a real concern
for the impact of judicial nonenforcement of a clear legislative mandate. This concern may have influenced the court
several months later when, in State v. Freetime53 and State v.
McCulley, 54 the court took a tougher view when presented
with harmless error arguments regarding other violations of
article 793.55 In both Freetime and McCulley, the ABA Standards recommended the procedures followed by the trial
47. 298 So. 2d 761 (La. 1974).
48. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 851(4).

49. Id. art. 793. For the view favoring juror notetaking, see ABA STANcited as ABA STANDARDS].
50. ABA STANDARDS, § 4.2.
51. 298 So. 2d at 765.
52. Id.
53. 303 So. 2d 487 (La. 19174) (jury reference to documentary evidence
during deliberations).
DARDS, Trial by Jury, § 4.2 (1968) [hereinafter

54. 310 So. 2d 833 (La. 1975) (jury hearing replay of testimony of state
witness).

55. In Freetime and McCulley the court reversed.
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judge, in clear violation of article 793. In both of the later
cases the defendant objected and the trial court was aware of
the violation in question.
State v. Graves5 6 presents a much simpler issue of harmless error. When a trial judge became aware of the infraction,
he ordered the bailiff to destroy the notes. He also told the
juror not to continue taking notes. The court dispensed with
the defendant's complaint quickly with reference to article
793 and to Ledet. In view of the fact that article 793 only
prohibits reference to the notes during deliberations, this violation of the "spirit" of the article was plainly harmless.
Judicial Comment on Evidence
In State v. Lane,5 7 defense counsel objected when the trial
court "commented on the evidence" in ruling on a defense
motion. 58 Counsel had questioned a police officer regarding a
report he made prior to trial and whether he recalled certain
statements made by witnesses. The officer replied that he did
not recall the statements. Defense counsel then moved for
production of the report. Denying the motion, the trial judge
said, "We can put it in the record that the witness has clearly
indicated that he does not recall having read the statement. '59 In affirming the conviction, the court makes an apparent exception to the "no comment" rule for "remarks
made by the trial judge in the jury's presence giving reasons
for admitting or excluding evidence or stating the purpose for
which evidence is offered or admitted," as long as they are
not "unfair" or "prejudicial" to the accused.6 0 Although
"harmless error"6 1 is not the apparent basis for the decision,
the court's opinion leaves room for speculation that though
such comments are error under article 772, they are harmless.
In State v. Hodgeson6 2 the district attorney objected during defense counsel's closing argument, contending that de56. 301 So. 2d 864 (La. 1974).
57. 302 So. 2d 880 (La. 1974).
58. See LA. CODE CRIM.P. art. 772. The "comment" in question was made

in the presence of the jury.
59. 302 So. 2d at 885; LA. CODE
CRIM. P. art. 806.

60. 302 So. 2d at 885.
61. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 921.

62. 305 So. 2d 421 (La. 1974).

CRIM.

P. art. 772. See also LA. CODE
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fense counsel misstated a witness's testimony. In sustaining
the objection the trial court said: "[The witness] never said
anything about a shotgun; I can tell you that." To this remark, made in the jury's presence, defense counsel objected
and moved for a mistrial. Affirming the conviction, the court
distinguished comments on evidence that have resulted in
reversals from those that generally have not.6 3 Comments on
evidence that have no "relevance to a determination of the
defendant's guilt or innocence, ' 64 although improper, are not
generally reversible error. As long as the improper comment
is "not one from which the jury could infer any expression of
the judge's opinion concerning a relevant issue or fact,"6 5 the
court is likely to find harmless error.
Viewed in light of the purpose of the clear legislative
prohibition contained in Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure articles 772 and 806 and the principle of harmless error,66 the court's rationale seems logical. The purpose of the
prohibition is, according to the court, "to insure that the jury
is in fact the judge of the law and the facts on the question of
guilt or innocence. 16 7 To the extent that judicial comments,
although improper, do not influence the jury in its role as
ultimate fact finder, no harm requiring reversal has been
done.
Read together, Hodgeson and Lane represent the position
that judicial comments on the evidence in the presence of the
63. See Justice Dixon's excellent discussion of the jurisprudence. 305 So.
2d at 430-31.
64. Id. at 431 (emphasis deleted).
65. Id.
66. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 772: "The judge in the presence of the jury
shall not comment upon the facts of the case, either by commenting upon or
recapitulating the evidence, repeating the testimony of any witness, or giving an opinion as to what has been proved, not proved, or refuted."
Id. art. 806: "The court shall not charge the jury concerning the facts of
the case and shall not comment upon the facts of the case, either by commenting upon or recapitulating the evidence, repeating the testimony of any
witness, or giving an opinion as to what has been proved, not proved, or
refuted."
Id. art. 921: "A judgment or ruling shall not be reversed by an appellate
court on any ground unless in the opinion of the court, after an examination
of the entire record, it appears that the error complained of has probably
resulted in a miscarriage of justice, is prejudicial to the substantial rights of
the accused, or constitutes a substantial violation of a constitutional or
statutory right."
67. 305 So. 2d at 430.
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jury are not permitted. No exception exists for comments
explaining the court's ruling on objections. These, although
improper, are not reversible error if they do not touch upon
evidence having relevance to the determination of guilt or
innocence.
SCOPE OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Assignment of Error
In State v. Shillow,68 despite contemporaneous objection
in the trial court, defendant failed to file the written assignments of error necessary in order to preserve the right to
complain of trial error. 69 In Shillow, the defendant reserved
nineteen bills of exceptions during the proceedings. He moved
for an appeal in October, 1973. The appeal was returnable in
December, 1974. By that time, the assignment of error procedure 70 had replaced the bill of exceptions. The defendant
failed to file either formal bills of exception or assignments of
error. Apparently he simply briefed eleven of his objections to
be argued on appeal. That mistake was fatal, for the supreme
court refused to consider the issues raised. Similarly, in State
v. Donnel171 and State v. Shaw, 72 the court, finding no written
assignments of errors in the record, restricted its review to
'73
errors "patent on the face of the record.
The purpose of the 1974 amendment to Louisiana Code of
Criminal Procedure article 92074 was to simplify the presentation of error on appeal. The need for the formal bill of exceptions no longer exists. The assignment of errors, a less complex procedure, replaced the bill of exceptions. But Act 207 of
1974 still requires a filing of the assigned error with the trial
court, just as it requires a designation of the portions of the
record to be lodged with the appeal. Some Louisiana lawyers
simply have failed to study the amendments, being under the
5
misimpression that only a trial objection is necessary.7
68. 310 So. 2d 103 (La. 1975).
69. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 920.
70. See La. Acts 1974, No. 207, amending LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 841-45,
920. The amendments became effective on July 31, 1974.
71. 318 So. 2d 3 (La. 1975).
72. 318 So. 2d 4 (La. 1975).
73. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 920(2).
74. La. Acts 1974, No. 207 amending LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 920 to abolish
the bill of exception and replace it with an assignment of errors procedure.
75. The objection is not necessary where a complaint is raised by written
motion. See LA. CADE CRIM. P. art. 841.
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The writer joins with Justice Barham in his dissent in
State v. Shaw, urging the court to remand the case to the trial
court to permit defense counsel to assign error when constitutional questions are raised. Any other approach, as Justice Barham indicates in Shaw, would spawn fears of collateral attacks 76 and untimely appeals. 77 Two earlier cases emphasize Justice Barham's point. In State v. Davis,78 the court
affirmed without considering the defendant's allegations of
error because counsel failed to perfect timely bills of exceptions. An out of time appeal was ordered and approximately a
year later the defendant's contentions were fully considered. 79 Similarly, in State v. Brown,80 the defendant was
awarded an out of time appeal after the court affirmed his
conviction without reviewing alleged error due to the failure
of counsel to timely file bills of exceptions. In the out of time
appeal, 81 the court, again affirming the conviction, considered
82
all of the contentions raised earlier but not considered.
Considerations of judicial economy dictate that the court
apply an "interest of justice" test in permitting the tardy
filing of assignment of errors. Article 844 as amended does not
restrict the time for filing assignment of errors to the return
date. The writer does not agree, as Justice Barham says in his
dissent in Shaw, that the new procedure is "unworkable"
because it requires assignment of error to the trial court
rather than the appellate court. A more liberal attitude on
the part of the appellate court and a little more knowledge of
Louisiana criminal procedure among some members of the
Louisiana bar 83 would solve this problem.
76. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1948), as amended by Pub. L. 89-711, § 21 (1966);
LA. CODE CRIM. P. art.

362.

77. See State v. Brown, 302 So. 2d 290 (La. 1974); State v. Davis, 259 La.
35, 249 So. 2d 193 (1971).

78. 259 La. 35, 249 So. 2d 193 (1971).
79. After exhausting his state remedies, the defendant finally secured a

new trial in collateral proceeding in the United States courts. See Davis v.
Heyd, 479 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1973).
80. 302 So. 2d 290 (La. 1974).
81. The out of time appeal, according to the court's opinion, was ordered

by a United States district court. The defendants were serving a life sentence
for aggravated rape. The Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed again.
82. In the first footnote, the court in the original appeal described the

error it was refusing to consider due to defense counsel's error. See 256 So.
2d at 619.
83. The writer does not mean to criticize the lawyers in the cases discussed. There may be understandable reasons, unknown to the writer, why
the assignment of errors was not timely filed.
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Designation of the Record
In State v. Boothe8 4 the Louisiana Supreme Court handled
the designation of record procedure of article 845. The trial
court failed to set a time within which the defendant was to
85
designate the portions of the record to be lodged on appeal,
and the defendant failed to make any designation. The supreme court, exercising its authority
under article 845, or86
dered up the necessary portions.

Presumably the court will not exercise its discretion in
some cases of inexcusable neglect on the part of defense
counsel. However, when the interest of justice requires the
court to order portions of the record, as was apparently the
case in Boothe, hopefully the court will continue to do so.
Under article 845, it should not be necessary for the
Louisiana Supreme Court to reverse or remand a conviction
for failure to provide a transcript, assuming that reporter
error does not make it impossible to obtain one by ordering it
from the trial court.
Error Patent on the Face of the Record
In State v. Refuge, 87 the defendant urged, on appeal, that
the trial judge committed reversible error during the course
of the proceedings when he "commented on the evidence." 88
Although the defendant had properly objected to the judge's
remark, he failed to properly preserve his right to complain of
the error.8 9 Finding that the error was not "discoverable from
an inspection of the pleadings and proceedings" 90 alone, the
court refused to consider defendant's contentions. "Inspection of the evidence" was necessary in order to review the
defendant's complaint. Thus, without a proper objection and
reserved bill of exceptions, or assignment of errors under the
amended procedure, the supreme court could not review the
alleged error.
84. 310 So. 2d 826 (La. 1975).
85. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 845.
86. The court cited LA. CONST. art. 1, § 19, providing for the defendant's
right of review "based upon a complete record of all evidence upon which the
judgment is found" in support of its exercise of authority under LA. CODE
CRIM. P. art. 845.
87. 300 So. 2d 489 (La. 1974).
88. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 772.
89. In this case he failed to "reserve a bill of exception" as required prior
to La. Acts 1974, No. 207. See former LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 841.
90. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 920(2).
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Similarly in State v. Oliveaux,91 a third offense DWI case,
the defendant contended, on the basis of earlier cases, 92 that
the state must establish that the court minutes of the prior
conviction of an unrepresented defendant show that he
waived counsel in order to use the prior conviction. The minutes of the defendant's prior conviction by guilty plea were
silent as to his waiver of counsel.9 3 The district attorney apparently offered the minute entry in question in support of
his evidence of prior convictions of DWI.9 4 On appeal the court
refused to consider the defendant's contentions. The error
was not properly raised and presented for review, not being
"patent on the face of the record." 95 The court said:
Mere presence of a document in the record transmitted to
this Court is not sufficient to allow us to review the
document for discoverable error under Article 920(2).96
In State v. Craddock,97 the defendant, on appeal, contended that the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury
as to certain verdicts that he argued were properly responsive to the indictment.9 8 In refusing to consider the defendant's allegations of error, the court noted that defendant did
not contemporaneously object to the trial court's charge.
Quoting from its earlier decision in State v. Daleo,99 the court
said:
[I]t is not considered proper that the defendant should be
permitted to sit idly by while the judge is giving an erroneous charge to the jury, take his chances on the verdict, and if against him, then ...take advantage of it.' ° °
In State v. Hunter,'01 despite the lack of contemporaneous
91. 312 So. 2d 337 (La. 1975).
92. See Monroe v. Fincher, 305 So. 2d 108 (La. 1974); State v. Coody, 275
So. 2d 773 (La. 1973).
93. 312 So. 2d at 339.
94. The writer assumes this because the exhibit was marked "State
Exhibit No. 2."
95. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 920(2); State v. Palmer, ?51 La. 759, 206 So.
2d 485 (1968).
96. 312 So. 2d at 339.
97. 307 So. 2d 342 (La. 1975).
98. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 815. The defendant was charged with
distribution of marijuana. At the time no responsive verdicts for such offense
were provided in LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 814.
99. 179 La. 516, 154 So. 437 (1934).
100. 307 So. 2d at 343.
101. 306 So. 2d 710 (La. 1975).
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objection, the court reversed on appeal due to the trial court's
failure to sequester the jury in a "capital" case.10 2 The complaint was first made in a motion for a new trial. 10 3 Following
its earlier decision in State v. Luquette,104 the court held that
the failure to sequester the jury in a capital case as required
by article 791 was "error patent on the face of the record" and
could be considered on appeal despite the lack of contem0 5
poraneous objection.1
Unless an error falls within the scope of Louisiana Code
of Criminal Procedure article 920(2), a contemporaneous objection 1 6 is normally required to preserve the right to complain on appeal. 10 7 The "error patent on the face of the record"
exception to the contemporaneous objection rule of article 841
has been defined in a series of cases' 0 8 concerning what error
falls within the scope of article 920(2). The court's holdings
are consistent with those earlier cases.
102. The trial court decided in view of Furmanv. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972), in the case of a rape committed prior to the "Furman amendments" to
LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 816 (see La. Acts 1973, No. 125, § 1), that aggravated
rape was a noncapital offense due to the inability of the state to impose the
death penalty. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Louisiana held in several
cases that Furman did not alter the classification of offenses established by
the legislature of Louisiana. Therefore, the offenses were "capital" despite
the lack of a death penalty. See State v. Rhymes, 284 So. 2d 923 (La. 1973);
State v. Flood, 263 La. 700, 269 So. 2d 212 (1972); State v. Holmes, 263 La. 685,
269 So. 2d 207 (1972).
103. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 851.
104. 275 So. 2d 396 (La. 1973).
105. The motion for a new trial is the only vehicle for raising errors in
the proceedings which "notwithstanding the exercise of reasonable diligence
by the defendant, [were] not discovered before the verdict. .. ." See LA. CODE
CRIM. P. art. 851(4). This ground for a new trial is ndt applicable here.
106. LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 841, 920(1).
107. There are certain circumstances under which an issue may be raised
in the motion for a new trial. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 851(4).
108. Many of these are discussed briefly in the decisions discussed
herein.

